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Introduction
Since the seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , legislative institutions have been extensively explored and legislative bargaining games have been widely applied in positive theory of policymaking and comparative models of political institutions. In all variants of the Baron-Ferejohn model, a proposer is selected according to a commonly known rule, e.g. random selection with equal probability or proportional to seat shares. He then proposes a policy or an allocation of bene…ts to a group of voters. According to a given voting rule, the proposal is either accepted or rejected. 1 If the proposal is accepted, the game ends and all legislators receive payo¤s as speci…ed by the accepted proposal. Otherwise, another proposer is selected, and so on. This process continues until a proposal is accepted or the game ends. The stationary equilibria of Baron-Ferejohn model predict that the legislator with proposal power will propose a minimal winning coalition consisting of himself and the "cheapest"set of voters necessary to ensure acceptance. All other voters will receive a payo¤ of zero. The amounts given to the coalition partners equal the coalition partners'expected payo¤s (or continuation values) if the proposal is rejected and the bargaining continues. The proposer will always choose as coalition partners the voters with the lowest continuation values. The division of spoils will in general be highly unequal, especially if the legislators are very impatient. Subsequently, the model is extended to a dynamic legislative bargaining game in which a default policy is endogenously determined (Baron 1996) . 2 This approach is characterized by the assumption that the policy chosen in the current period will serve as the status quo in the future periods. This approach is particularly important in the study of government budgets. In modern democratic countries a majority proportion of total government spending is conducted in the form of entitlement programs. For example, in 2007 the U.S. government spent 586 million dollars on social security, 394.5 million dollars on medicare, 276.4 million dollars on medicaid, 367 million dollars on unemployment insurance and other welfare programs, and 72.6 dollars on veteran subsidy. Together these entitlement programs composed more than 60 percent of the total budget of 2.8 trillion dollars. In entitlement programs bene…ts are distributed and once enacted, they are in e¤ect until they are re- 1 This is the case of a "closed rule". Under an open rule other legislators may be selected to propose amendments. 2 See Duggan and Kalandrakis (2007) for an extensive survey of this literature.
formed in subsequent legislative periods. In many cases, e.g. the U.S. Social Security Act of 1935, bene…ciaries can sue the government if bene…ts are with-held.
With a one-dimensional policy space and single-peaked preferences, Baron (1996) shows that, in the long run, the policy will converge to the policy alternative preferred by the median legislator. Baron and Herron (2003) extend the model to include a multidimensional policy space. Kalandrakis (2004; 2007) provides a formal analysis of the paradigmatic case in a divide-the-dollar setting. He shows that there exist stationary equilibria where, in the long run, every proposer captures the entire bene…ts. Battaglini and Coate (2007;  2008) apply the dynamic legislative bargaining games to study collective choice of public investment and public debt.
Subsequently, various other legislative bargaining models have been proposed. The model most relevant to our paper is Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006) who examine legislative policy making in institutions with agenda setting and an evolving default policy. A default policy is de…ned as the policy that will be implemented at the end of the legislative period unless it is replaced by a new policy that then becomes the new default policy.
Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006) consider a distributive politics framework with ex ante known, …nitely many rounds of proposal-making and voting. They show that the last proposer is able to pass his favorite policy under relatively weak conditions. As a consequence, the …nal policy outcome is highly unequal, and the last proposer is able to obtain his ideal policy.
Our paper is in part motivated by recent empirical work that suggests limits to the proposal power predicted by the Baron-Ferejohn model. First, Knight (2005) recently tested the closed rule Baron-Ferejohn model using US data on the allocation of congressionally earmarked transportation projects across electoral districts. 3 The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction that proposal power is valuable, but shows that it is signi…cantly To formally study the constraints of proposal power we propose a di¤erent approach that focuses on the non-proposing voters. To analyze this case as cleanly as possible we consider the pure case where these voters have no proposal power at all. Of course, this is not an interesting case in any of the versions of the Baron-Ferejohn model with or without a dynamically changing status quo, as players without proposal power would receive an equilibrium payo¤ of zero. Indeed, it can be shown (Diermeier and Myerson 1994 ) that in a divide-the-dollar setting where a player has veto power, but lacks proposal power, while all other players have some proposal power, but no veto power, the veto player receives an equilibrium payo¤ of zero.
Our theory consists of three key elements. First, reconsideration is allowed and the default policy evolves. In other words, the passage of a proposal does not prevent the legislature from coming back to the same issue at a later date. Rather, it changes the default for subsequent policymaking. This setup is reminiscent of that of Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006).
Second, whereas Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006) assume a …xed and predetermined number of proposal rounds as well as commonly known …xed order of proposers, here the …nal proposal round is endogenously determined rather than exogenously given. Intuitively, our setup corresponds to the case where policymaking proceeds until any legislator with proposal power has no more incentive to make a new proposal to replace a previously passed bill.
Third, proposal power is concentrated and persistent throughout the legislative session.
Our motivation for this assumption is given by our theoretical purpose: To investigate endogenous constraints on proposal power. However, some legislative systems come quite close to this idealized case. For example, comparative scholars have long observed that compared to presidential systems the constitutional features of parliamentary systems lead to high levels of agenda control for the executive, i.e. the cabinet (Doering 1995) . In many cases, that power is concentrated within the prime minister. Our single, persistent agenda setter therefore may be interpreted as the prime minister. Importantly, a concentration of proposal power by law does not necessarily lead to valuable proposal power in practice.
Surprisingly, the possibility of reconsideration may put signi…cant limits on proposal power even in the case of a single proposer. As we show, it may induce legislators with no proposal power to "protect" the bene…ts of other non-proposing legislators. This mutual protection is an equilibrium phenomenon born out of pure self-interests. As in the standard model legislators care only about their own bene…ts, not the bene…ts of others. However, in equilibrium there is an incentive to protect others as this limits the proposer's ability to play o¤ the voters against each other. Intuitively, non-proposer A protects non-proposer B so that proposer C cannot use the low reservation value of B to exploit A. The ex post value of proposal power is therefore constrained. The underlying mechanism can be illustrated by two examples below.
Example 1. Consider a legislature with three players. The …rst player is assumed to be the agenda setter. The legislature must divide 6 dollars, where each dollar is indivisible.
Suppose the initial default is d = (1; 2; 3) ; where the i-th element of d refers to the amount that goes to the i-th player. A default is the policy that will be implemented at the end of the legislative session if no new policy is made in the rest of the session. The agenda setter has sole power to make proposals and initiate reconsiderations. A proposal, once made, is immediately voted in the legislature by majority rule against the default. A policy proposal, once approved in the legislature, serves as the new default and may be subject to reconsideration if the agenda setter chooses to make a new proposal to replace it. The policy that (as default) survives until the end of the legislative session is the …nal policy outcome.
It is easy to see that in a one-shot Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining game under a closed rule, the setter would propose b x = (4; 2; 0) : This policy would be approved by the players who receive positive payo¤s and rejected by the player who receives nothing.
Notice that the last player is fully expropriated since his vote is not needed. However, if the agenda setter is likely to have a chance to reconsider the policy issue and make another proposal, the second player would not accept policy b x in equilibrium, even though b x gives the second player exactly the same as the default. To see why, consider counterfactually what would happen if this player accepted b x. In this situation, the agenda setter would have an incentive to reconsider the policy issue and propose b x 0 = (6; 0; 0) ; which would not be vetoed by the last player, who is indi¤erent. This implies that the second player would be eventually fully expropriated if he voted for b x in the …rst place.
By the same logic, the agenda setter is not able to pass any policy that gives the last player, whose vote is not needed, any amount less than 2 dollars. The equilibrium policy outcome is thus x = (2; 2; 2) ; an egalitarian division of the six dollars. In this equilibrium, the second player wants to protect the bene…ts for the last player, since by doing so the second player secures his long-term bargaining position in the legislature. Note that the value of proposal power is reduced compared to a case without reconsideration even if there is a sole proposer.
Example 2. Consider a legislature with …ve players. Again, the …rst player is assumed to be the sole agenda setter. The legislature must divide 10 dollars, where each dollar is indivisible. Suppose the initial default is d = (0; 1; 2; 3; 4) : Assume the political process is as given in the …rst example. As before, in one-shot Baron-Ferejohn legislative bargaining under a closed rule, the setter would propose b x = (7; 1; 2; 0; 0) : The last two players are fully expropriated since their votes are not needed. However, if under some institution the agenda setter is likely to have a chance to reconsider the policy issue and make another proposal, players 2 and 3 would not accept policy b x in equilibrium. With b x as the new default policy, they would be fully expropriated and eventually given nothing.
One possible policy proposal players 2 and 3 would accept in an equilibrium is x = (4; 2; 2; 2; 0) : With x as the new default, the agenda setter would not be able to pass any new policy that gives himself more than 4 dollars. This is because players 2; 3 and 4 all have incentives to protect the bene…ts for one another. If any player i 2 f2; 3; 4g was expropriated and given less than 2 dollars, the agenda setter would have incentives to reconsider the policy and ally with both the last player and the expropriated one.
In this equilibrium some voter, player 4 in the example, is not fully expropriated even if his vote is not needed. Players 1 and 2 vote for x against the initial default, and player 1 even receives more than what he would receive from the default. The value of proposal power is substantially reduced. Out of fear that the agenda setter may use his proposal power to exploit those players with lower reservation values in the future, a group of players take care of one another even if they are self-interested.
Below we develop a general model that captures the intuitions illustrated in the examples. As most of the literature, the focus is on stationary equilibria due to the recursive nature of the game. A stationary equilibrium for dynamic legislative bargaining with an endogenous default needs not exist, and, if it does, it is usually associated with mixed strategies as shown in a few recent studies in the literature. 4 However, in the game considered here, if the probability for reconsideration is su¢ ciently high, there exists a class of pure-strategy stationary equilibria. 5 We then characterize these equilibria for a legislature with an arbitrary odd number of members.
In the pure-strategy stationary equilibria, the possibility of reconsideration limits agenda control in the case where proposal power is persistent. This is in marked contrast not only to the models a la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) , but also to agenda control models with sincere voting (McKelvey 1976) , where an agenda setter could achieve any point in the policy space, or sophisticated voting (Banks 1980, Shepsle and Weingast 1980) , where the set of attainable policies is only limited to the Banks set or the uncovered set, respectively.
Note also that policy outcomes implied by our pure-strategy equilibria are very di¤erent from the results obtained by Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006) , where the last proposer can capture all or almost all of the bene…ts, or Kalandrakis (2004; 2007) , where in the long run every proposer is able to take all.
We also show that there is a second class of stationary equilibria characterized by mixed proposal strategies. In those equilibria, the agenda setter randomizes among possible winning coalitions and strategically designs a series of policy proposals so that he eventually captures almost all of the bene…ts similar to Kalandrakis (2007) . However, we show that if legislatures need to make a decision on whether to discuss a policy ("put in on the agenda") these equilibria disappear.
We …nally extend the core model to address not only distributional issues but also e¢ ciency properties. When policy e¢ ciency is compared, the institution that allows the possibility of reconsideration always dominates the institution with closed-rule bargaining.
The possibility of reconsideration can be interpreted as lack of commitment by the agenda setter. Whereas it has been commonly agreed that lack of commitment by policymakers is a general source of policy ine¢ ciency, the model considered here provides a reversed example and suggests the importance to distinguish di¤erent types of lack of commitment. 6 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and Section 3 de…nes a stationary equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 characterize a class of pure-strategy equilibria for a small legislature with three players and a large legislature with …ve or more than …ve players, respectively. Section 6 presents a di¤erent class of mixed-strategy equilibria and discusses the issue of equilibrium selection. Section 7 extends the model to include public goods production and addresses welfare implications of the possibility of reconsideration.
Section 8 concludes and …nally, the Appendix includes all the proofs.
The Model
Consider a legislature that consists of n = 2m + 1 players, labeled i = 1; 2; :::; n; where
The legislature must decide on how to divide units of total bene…ts among the n players, where 2 N is exogenously given. The policy space is …nite and denoted by
Given any policy x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n ) 2 X; player i receives x i units of bene…ts and derives a utility of
There is one agenda setter in the legislature. Assume this position is occupied by player
1:
The agenda setter is conferred the sole power to make policy proposals from the policy space during a legislative session. All other players, i 6 = 1; are referred to as voters.
The legislature selects a policy over the course of potentially multiple rounds of proposal making, where the number of rounds depends on exogenous factors and the decision made by the setter. Activities prior to each round t establish a default policy d t 2 X: In each round t;
once reached, the agenda setter can choose to make a proposal x 0 t 2 X or pass the proposal round. A "pass" is directly modeled as a proposal x 0 t = d t ; to simplify the mathematical formulation. The proposal, once made, is then put to an immediate vote against d t : If it is approved by majority rule, it replaces d t as the default policy and d t+1 = x 0 t : If it is not approved, the default policy remains the same and d t+1 = d t : As the legislative session commences, an initial default d 1 2 X is exogenously given. The policy that survives as default till the end of the session is implemented. The legislative session may end endogenously at round t; if the prevailing default d t is such that the setter will choose to pass any possible round t 0 t: The session may also be terminated exogenously after any proposal round t with probability 1 ; where 2 [0; 1) is the probability that the agenda setter will get the opportunity to reconsider the policy that emerges from round t:
We interpret as a parameter of the legislative institution, since various congressional rules, unmodeled here, may a¤ect the likelihood of chances for reconsideration. For example, a = 0 is associated with a one-shot legislative bargaining under a closed rule (Baron and Ferejohn 1989) . This paper focuses on institutions with 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. 7 
Equilibrium De…nition
This paper focuses the analysis on stationary equilibria. 8 In any proposal round t 2 N;
the only payo¤-relevant state variable is the prevailing default d t 2 X; which will be the policy outcome if not replaced by any new proposal in the rest of the legislative session.
The legislature thus faces an identical collective choice problem in proposal rounds t and t 0 6 = t; if the prevailing default policies in those two rounds are identical. Sationarity implies that the players condition their strategies only on the prevailing default. From now on, the subscript t for proposal round is dropped from the notations.
Let : X ! P (X) be the mixed proposal strategy played by the agenda setter, where P (X) is the space of probability measures over X: In particular, (d; x) denotes the probability that the agenda setter proposes a policy x 2 X given a prevailing default d 2 X:
Let U i (x) be the expected utility of player i if a policy x is approved. With probability 1 the legislative session is exogenously terminated and this player receives a utility of
With probability the agenda setter has a chance to revisit the policy issue and makes a new policy proposal according to the mixed strategy : In this case, player i receives 7 In principle, the probability of session continuation needs not be stationary over proposal rounds. For example, in the model of Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo (2006), t = 1 for all t < T; and t = 0 for all t T;
where T is the …xed number of proposal rounds. an expected utility of
We refer to U i : X ! R as the value function of player i:
Following the de…nition of the value function, U i (d) is the reservation value of player i with a prevailing default d 2 X; where the reservation value is de…ned as the player's expected utility if the prevailing default remains at the end of the current proposal round.
We make two assumptions regarding how the players break indi¤erence.:
Any player votes against a policy proposal if and only if passage of the proposal makes him strictly worse o¤.
Assumption 2. The agenda setter never makes any policy proposal that is destined to be vetoed by a majority of voters. This assumption can be justi…ed by an in…nitesimal cost incurred on the agenda setter whenever he makes a policy proposal which is di¤erent from the prevailing default. Therefore, in those situations where the agenda setter cannot improve his expected utility by proposal making, he simply lets the prevailing default remain, or equivalently, "proposes" the default policy, which will be approved unanimously.
The agenda setter maximizes his expected utility by proposal making. Any policy alternative is politically feasible if, as a proposal it can be approved by a majority of players. By Assumption 2, the maximization problem of the agenda setter is subject to the constraint of political feasibility. By Assumption 1, this feasibility constraint is equivalent to an incentive compatibility constraint that a majority of players are weakly better o¤ with the proposed policy than with the prevailing default. To sum up, for any prevailing default d 2 X; any policy x 2 X that the agenda setter may propose with a strictly positive probability must solve
where j j denotes the number of elements in a set.
We are now ready to de…ne a legislative equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A legislative equilibrium is a proposal strategy and a set of value functions
1. Given ; U i (x) satis…es equation (1) for any i:
The key messages of this paper are based on a class of legislative equilibria with pure strategies. In particular, De…nition 2 A pure-strategy legislative equilibrium is a policy rule f : X ! X and a set of value functions fU i g n i=1 such that and fU i g n i=1 constitute a legislative equilibrium, where
Consider any pure-strategy legislative equilibrium with policy rule f (assuming its exis-
For the policy issue considered in this paper, there exists some equilibrium in which for some d 2 X;
In other words, for some initial default the legislative session never ends endogenously along the equilibrium path. 9 In this paper, we ignore the discussion on those equilibria in which the setter never stops proposal making until the session is exogenously terminated. Those equilibria can be eliminated if a tiny proposal cost is suitably assumed. Instead, for any legislative equilibrium considered here, there exists T 2 N such that, for all d 2 X; f t (d) = f t 1 (d) for all t T: We refer to a policy b x 2 X as the …nal policy outcome resulting from an initial default d 2 X; if f (b x) = b x and there exists
A preliminary analysis shows that, except for rare cases, the policy outcome in any equilibrium for one-shot legislative bargaining under a closed rule cannot be the …nal policy outcome in a pure-strategy legislative equilibrium for the game that allows the possibility of reconsideration with 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. This observation is presented in the …rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Let b f be the policy rule in any pure-strategy legislative equilibrium for the game with = 0: Consider the game in which > 0. In any legislative equilibrium with
9 For example, assume n = 3; = 1 and the policy space is f z 2 = z 3 ; and f z 3 = z 2 : Assume the initial default is d = z 2 : Then f t (d) = z 2 for any t even and
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
The next two sections analyze the games for a small legislature with three players and for a large legislature with any odd n 5 players, respectively.
A Legislature with Three Players
This section considers a legislature with three players and characterizes a class of purestrategy legislature equilibria.
Proposition 2 Assume n = 3; 2 N; X = 3 and 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. There exists a pure-strategy legislative equilibrium f; fU i g 3 i=1 such that:
is the set of absorbing states.
The agenda setter makes at most one proposal along the equilibrium path.
3. For all d 2 X;
and
; where
Part 1 of the proposition states that there exist policies which as default the agenda setter is either unwilling to or unable to replace by any other policy. Moreover, given any policy in this set of absorbing states, the two voters receive the same amount of bene…ts. Part 2 says that if the agenda setter ever makes a proposal, he chooses from policies in the set of absorbing states regardless of the initial default. Therefore, reconsideration never happens in equilibrium although it is permitted. Therefore, it is the possibility of reconsideration, not its actual occurrence, that changes the nature of legislative bargaining.
Part 3 of the proposition presents the policy rule and value functions in equilibrium. In particular, the agenda setter seeks voting support from the voter with a lower reservation value and expropriates the other voter to the extent that the two voters receive equal amount of bene…ts. In a setup of dynamic legislative bargaining, it is not necessarily trivial to assess which voter is the cheaper one to buy. In the special case with three players, this critical voter is the one who receives less from the default.
As an example, consider any d 2 X such that
Therefore, the bounds on the reservation values are
for 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. In equilibrium, the agenda setter o¤ers e (d) units of bene…ts to both voters. Among all policy alternatives in the set of absorbing states, this is one that just satis…es player 2 by his reservation value and maximizes the expected utility of the agenda setter.
Incentives of the Players
A central question is: Why does the agenda setter have to o¤er both voters an equal amount of bene…ts?
Consider the same example. Suppose that the agenda setter o¤ers e (d) units of bene…ts to player 2 but only some e < e (d) units to player 3: In this case, player 3 is expropriated and he must vote against the proposal. We claim that play 2 will also vote against it.
To see why, consider counter-factually, what would happen if player 2 approved the policy
e ; e (d) ; e ) : With probability 1 the session would end immediately and x is implemented. With probability ; the agenda setter would have a chance to reconsider the policy issue and propose a new policy ( 2e (x ) ; e (x ) ; e (x )) : This policy satis…es player 3 by his reservation value so will be approved in majority voting.
Note that
Therefore by accepting policy x ; player 2 would be eventually expropriated since the policy would be reconsidered. Anticipating such an adverse consequence, player 2 will always vote against the proposal of x ; even though according to this proposal he is given e (d) d 2 units of bene…ts. By this argument, player 2 will not allow the agenda setter to expropriate the other voter too much so that, in the rest of the legislative session, the other voter will have a lower reservation value than player 2 and look more attractive for the agenda setter to ally with. As a consequence, the best the setter can do for himself is to o¤er both voters equal amount of bene…ts and just satisfy the voter who is given less by the default.
Although the voters derive utilities only from the bene…ts they receive, they form indirect preferences over the distribution of bene…ts. In the above example, player 2 strictly On the other hand, the agenda setter has an incentive to expropriate as much as possible.
The fact that the agenda setter proposes less bene…ts for himself than what he would do under a closed rule is driven by the fact that he is constrained by the voters who constrain him in equilibrium. As a consequence, the agenda setter has limited ability to expropriate the voter whose vote is not needed.
Multiple Equilibria
Part 3 of the proposition also implies the existence of multiple equilibria. First, suppose everyone believes that, if the default (2; 3; 1) remains and the legislative session continues, policy b x 1 = (4; 1; 1) will be proposed and approved in the next proposal round. Given this expectation, the reservation values of players 2 and 3 are
Player 3 is the cheaper voter for the setter to buy. The agenda setter has to o¤er both voters 1 unit of bene…ts to get a vote from player 3; and b x 1 is the best the setter can achieve.
The fact that the agenda setter proposes b x 1 with the prevailing default (2; 3; 1) is consistent with the common belief of the players. Second, suppose instead everyone believes that, if the default (2; 3; 1) remains and the legislative session continues, policy b x 2 = (2; 2; 2) will be proposed and approved in the next proposal round. Given this expectation, the reservation values of players 2 and 3 are
Again player 3 is the cheaper voter, although his reservation value is higher than that in the previous case. With a similar argument, in this equilibrium the agenda setter proposes b x 2 under the prevailing default (2; 3; 1) : The proposal strategy is again consistent with the common belief of the players.
How beliefs are coordinated goes beyond the equilibrium analysis provided in this paper.
In principle, legislators may have channels to communicate with one another through policy deliberation or in private negotiations.
Bounds on the Values of Proposal Power
Not any belief can be supported. In the example above, policy (6; 0; 0) or (0; 3; 3) cannot be the equilibrium policy outcome if the initial default is given by (2; 3; 1) : In particular, in any equilibrium the agenda setter gets more than what he receives from the default policy.
Moreover, the voter from whom the agenda setter seeks voting support must receive no less than what he is allocated by the default. The next proposition addresses these properties and implies that Part 3 of Proposition 2 has presented all pure-strategy equilibria such that Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 2 are satis…ed. This section thus completely characterizes a certain class of legislative equilibria.
Proposition 3 Assume n = 3; 2 N; X = 3 and 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. In any
This proposition is an implication of stationarity. In particular, in any pure-strategy legislative equilibrium, for any i;
The fact that the agenda setter must weakly prefer his proposal to the default thus implies that
The requirement that at least one voter must approve the proposal, together with the restriction that 
A Legislature with Five or More Than Five Players
This section characterizes pure-strategy equilibria for a legislature with any odd n 5
players. The intuitions established in the previous section carry over to the case with a larger legislature. Before results are stated in the next proposition, additional notations are de…ned to simplify the presentation. For any policy x 2 X and any e 0 2 Z + ; let L (x; e 0 ) fi 6 = 1 : x i e 0 g be the set of voters who receive no more than e 0 units of bene…ts from x; and K (x; e 0 ) fi 6 = 1 : x i = e 0 g be the set of voters who receive exactly e 0 units of bene…ts. 11
Proposition 4 Assume odd n 5; 2 N; X = n and 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. There exists a legislative equilibrium (f; fU i g n i=1 ) such that:
For all
and The proof is presented in the Appendix.
This proposition is stated in parallel to its counterpart, Proposition 2. Part 1 states that there exist policies which as default the agenda setter is either unwilling to or unable to replace by any other policy. The ideal policy z 1 of the agenda setter is obviously one of the absorbing states since the agenda setter will have no incentive to change it. For any other policy in the set of absorbing states, some m + 1 voters receive equal and positive 1 1 If this is helpful, L is for Less Than Or Equal To and K is for Equal To.
amount of the bene…ts and the other m 1 voters receive nothing. 12 Part 2, again, asserts that reconsideration does not occur in equilibrium.
Part 3 of the proposition presents the policy rule and value functions in equilibrium.
Although it appears complicated, a pure-strategy equilibrium can be constructed by a simple 
The inequality is established
In this case, the equilibrium proposal strategy is to o¤er e 
As a numerical example, assume n = 5 (m = 2); = 10 and d = (0; 1; 2; 3; 4) : Possible equilibrium outcomes include (4; 2; 2; 2; 0) ; (4; 2; 2; 0; 2) ; (1; 3; 3; 3; 0) ; (1; 3; 3; 0; 3) ; Second, all the m + 1 voters who receive bene…ts receive an equal amount. Third, some, or even all, of the voters who vote for the proposal in equilibrium may receive more bene…ts than they would from the initial default. Reconsider the example with d = (0; 1; 2; 3; 4) :
In the equilibrium such that the policy outcome is (4; 2; 2; 2; 0) ; players 2 and 3 vote for the proposal. Whereas player 3 is indi¤erent, player 2's bene…ts are raised from 1 unit to 2 units. In the equilibrium such that the policy outcome is (1; 3; 3; 0; 3) ; again players 2 and 3 vote for the proposal. Moreover, both supporters of the proposed policy receive more than from the default. and
; if i 6 = 1:
That is, in the beginning of the legislative session the expected utilities of both voters are strictly lower than their utilities had the initial default materialized.
The proof is presented in the Appendix. Part 1 of the proposition states that, in the presented equilibrium, the only policy that can persist as default is the policy z 1 that gives all the bene…ts to the agenda setter. Part 2 says that, for any initial default, the policy converges to z 1 within at most two proposal rounds. Along the equilibrium path, reconsideration occurs either once or never.
Parts 3 and 4 describe the mixed proposal strategies and the value functions. The agenda setter is able to pass his ideal policy right away if nothing is given to some voter by the default. Otherwise, the setter strategically manipulates the sequence of proposals so that he is able to pass his ideal policy in the second proposal round, if the legislative session reaches there. In the interim stage, i.e., the …rst proposal round, the agenda setter takes away the bene…ts from one voter and give them to the other one. This is done with randomization so that, with positive probability, each voter may be given nothing at the end of round one.
As an example, assume = 6 and d = (2; 3; 1) : In the equilibrium described above, with probability ; the setter seeks voting support from player 2; who is the voter favored by the default, and with probability Mixed-strategy equilibria also exist, in a similar fashion, for a legislature with …ve or more than …ve players. They are presented in the next proposition. 2. The agenda setter makes at most two proposals along the equilibrium path. jfi :
That is, in the beginning of the legislative session the expected utilities of at least a majority of players are strictly lower than their utilities had the initial default mate- The mixed-strategy equilibria, again, are driven by self-ful…lling expectations. In equilibrium, regardless of the initial default, all players anticipate that, if the default remains, the agenda setter will play mixed strategies and eventually implement his ideal policy. Given such a common belief, all voters must have very small reservation values and are willing to accept a policy proposal that delivers very small expected utilities to them and eventually carries out their expectation. This equilibrium thus exhibits an extreme form of the "power to propose".
So far two classes of legislative equilibria have been established for the game considered here. In one class of legislative equilibria, the agenda setter plays a pure proposal strategy, a group of voters protect the bene…ts for one another in order to secure their bargaining positions in the subsequent proposal rounds, and the value of proposal power is constrained.
In the other class of legislative equilibria, the agenda setter plays mixed proposal strategies and has a nearly dictatorial power. The two classes of legislative equilibria display opposite features.
The obvious next question is whether and on what grounds we can choose between the two classes of equilibria.
We here present an argument that suggests that the pure-strategy legislative equilibria should be observed. Notice that in all legislatures the policy decision-making process is proceeded by a procedural stage where the legislature decides on whether to deliberate on a given topic. Recall that in the mixed-strategy equilibria a majority of legislators expects to be strictly worse o¤ compared to the case where no legislative deliberation takes place.
Formally, consider an augmented game with one additional stage before legislative bargaining begins. In that pre-bargaining stage, an initial default d 2 X is exogenously given and one player (e.g., player 1) is randomly selected as the proposer. 14 The legislature must decide by majority rule whether or not to enter the legislative bargaining process speci…ed in Section 2. The choice is denoted by 2 f0; 1g : If = 1; then the legislative bargaining game commences. Instead if = 0; then the legislative session ends immediately and the initial default d is implemented. Part 5 of Propositions 6 and 7 assert that, in the mixed-strategy equilibria in which the setter has a nearly dictatorial power, more than onehalf of the voters are better o¤ with the initial default than with the equilibrium policy outcome of the legislative bargaining game. Therefore, if the players anticipate that the setter will play expropriating mixed strategies, = 0 will be chosen by majority rule in the pre-bargaining stage. In other words, conditional on the occurrence of legislative bargaining over some policy issue, the …nal policy outcome should be consistent with the prediction of some pure-strategy equilibrium but not a mixed-strategy one.
In conclusion, it is more reasonable to select those pure-strategy equilibria (in Sections 4 and 5) as predictions of the theory of legislative bargaining. This view can be tested by experiments and by congressional data. We leave these empirical investigations for future research.
Policy E¢ ciency and Possibility of Reconsideration
The model of distributive politics allows us to identify the value of proposal power but does not address welfare implications. This section extends the model so that the size of total bene…ts is also a policy variable to be determined in the legislature. We then examine how 1 4 It does not matter whether the agenda setter is chosen before or after the pre-bargaining stage.
a legislative institution that allows the possibility of reconsideration may improve policy e¢ ciency.
Consider a legislature with three players. They must jointly produce bene…ts that they can divide and consume. A policy x = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) speci…es not only allocation but also size of the total bene…ts. The policy space is therefore X = S 1
=0
3 ; where 3 is the distributive policy space for three players to divide units of total bene…ts. Public production is costly. The cost function is assumed to be quadratic and given by
where is a constant marginal cost of production. Each player i is assumed to share equally the production cost, and for any policy x 2 X; derive a utility of
where is a common marginal utility of bene…t consumption. 15 The initial default is assumed to be d = (0; 0; 0) : That is, if no agreement is made in the legislature, there will be no production and consumption of the bene…ts.
If the policy was chosen by a benevolent dictator, the size of total bene…ts would be ; at which level marginal social cost of production is equal to marginal utility of bene…ts consumption. Here, a policy is made through the political process of legislative bargaining.
In a one-shot legislative bargaining under a closed rule, the agenda setter needs to satisfy one voter, for example j; by his reservation value U j ((0; 0; 0)) = 0 and can fully expropriate the other voter. By proposing any policy x associated with x P 3 i=1 x i units of total bene…ts, the setter can take
units. There is overproduction of the bene…ts in equilibrium since the setter only internalizes the costs paid by himself and voter j:
If reconsideration is allowed and 2 [0; 1) is su¢ ciently large, by the argument in Section 4, the agenda setter has to o¤er both voters an equal amount of bene…ts whatever level of the total bene…ts production. This is because each voter is induced to protect the bene…ts of the other voter in order to secure his own long-term bargaining position in the legislature.
Therefor, by proposing any policy x associated with x units of total bene…ts, the setter can take no more than 
;
and there are distinct j; k 6 = 1 such that
2. Consider the bargaining institution with the possibility of reconsideration and with 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. There exists a legislative equilibrium with policy rule f such that:
3. The agenda setter strictly prefers the bargaining institution with a closed rule to the one with the possibility of reconsideration and with 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large. In particular, su¢ ciently large dominates the one under a closed rule in policy e¢ ciency. In particular,
The proof of Part 2 is presented in the Appendix.
Parts 1 and 2 of the proposition summarize the preceding analysis. Parts 3 states that the agenda setter is always better o¤ if he could commit to making a proposal once and for all than if he is allowed to reconsider an approved policy. On the other hand, Part 4
says that social welfare de…ned by aggregate utility is unambiguously improved with the possibility of reconsideration.
Proposition 8 can be generalized for a legislature with any odd n 5 players. 16 In equilibrium there is always overproduction of the bene…ts regardless of the bargaining institution, but the same welfare comparison holds. For a 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large, the agenda setter internalizes production costs paid by one more voter than he would do with = 0: Therefore, with the possibility of reconsideration the extent of overproduction is restrained and aggregate utility is enhanced. Paradoxically granting some political actor,
here the agenda setter, more power may improve social welfare.
The possibility of reconsideration can be interpreted as lack of commitment by the agenda setter. While it is commonly agreed that lack of commitment by policymakers is a source of ine¢ ciency, to the contrary, the model considered here provides a counterexample:
Lack of commitment by an agenda setter with persistent proposal power may lead to less unequal allocations and more e¢ cient policy outcomes. This suggests the importance to distinguish di¤erent types of commitment technologies.
Constitutional Design
The model in this paper allows an analysis of constitutional design. Here a "constitution" refers to a set of rules by which a collective decision is made. 17 Formally, suppose there is a constitutional stage preceding legislative bargaining. In the constitutional stage the legislature must decide whether or not to allow reconsideration in the political process of policymaking. In particular, assume the legislature is restricted to choosing from 2 0; ; where 2 [0; 1) is su¢ ciently large. Constitutional parameter = 0 refers to one-shot legislative bargaining under a closed-rule, whereas = refers to a bargaining institution in which reconsideration is allowed. The choice of depends on whether the identity of the agenda setter is known in the constitutional stage.
Suppose that before a constitutional choice is made player 1 has been recognized as agenda setter in the legislative bargaining stage. Then except for rare cases player 1 will strictly prefer = 0 to = and the player whose vote is needed by the agenda setter in the legislative bargaining stage will be indi¤erent between the two constitutional choices.
As a consequence, the legislative procedure that forbids reconsideration can be chosen by majority voting.
Suppose instead that the constitutional choice is made under a veil of ignorance, in the sense that the identity of the agenda setter in the legislative stage is unknown. In this case the legislature will unanimously agree to choose = : Reconsideration is allowed since the possibility of reconsideration enhances aggregate utility as well as ex ante utility of each player.
Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a new analytical framework of legislative bargaining. A central idea is that policymaking is …nalized only after all players with agenda control have no more incentive to replace the default policy. The setup, we believe, captures important features of legislative decision-making such as an endogenous default and the possibility of reconsideration without a predetermined last proposal round. We identify a class of pure-strategy equilibria in which a group of voters protect the bene…ts for one another against the agenda setter. The model is tractable and can be easily applied to dynamic models or embedded in a public …nance setup. Baron and Ferejohn (1989) suggest that the possibility of amendments could also lead to reduced proposal power and possibly a supermajority voting coalition. With possibility of amendments, any agenda setter has to consider the fact that some of the other legislators may be recognized to move or to amend his proposal. The initial agenda setter thus faces a trade-o¤ between increasing his own share of the bene…ts and increasing the probability that his proposal will be moved and accepted. This induces the agenda setter to care possibly more of the other legislators than a bare majority. The distribution of bene…ts is thus more even and the value of proposal power more constrained. Our paper suggests a di¤erent mechanism. With the possibility of reconsideration, whereas the agenda setter wants to expropriate as much as possible, the other legislators with no proposal power have incentive to take care of some of the others. Any legislator with no agenda control could prevent their bargaining power from being weakened in the future by protecting the others from being su¢ ciently expropriated by the agenda setter. Therefore, granting the agenda setter more power implies a less valuable power. In other words, the amendment process discussed by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) focuses on the incentives of proposers, whereas our theory focuses on nonproposers.
There are various natural extensions of the model. First, we may want to study the trade-o¤s between proposal incentives and exploitation risk in a model with reconsideration.
Consider a voter i that has to decide on whether to accept a proposal that exploits some other voter j. If i does not expect to be the proposer in the future our results will hold, however, if he does he may want to vote to accept because this will improve his bargaining position as a future proposer. With random proposer recognition there will be a trade-o¤ between these two e¤ects that can be studied in a more general model.
Another extension would be to replace the agenda setter by a gatekeeper. We de…ne a gatekeeper as the player who is conferred the veto right to block any policy proposal made by some others and at the same time able to propose a new policy in some situations. The sequence of events in the game can be modi…ed as follows: There is an initial default and one player is randomly assigned to be a gatekeeper. The players then are able to make policy proposals in turn. A player can choose to pass his turn if proposing a policy does not make himself better o¤. Once a proposal is made, it has to be approved by the gatekeeper and then voted on against the default by majority rule. A passed proposal becomes the new default in future proposal rounds. Legislative interaction ceases after all players pass their proposal turns. The …nal default policy is then implemented. In a model like this, we would be able to compare the respective values of proposal power and gate-keeping power.
This analytical framework could also be incorporated into fuller developed models of public …nance and macroeconomic policy choice. 18 As recent empirical studies on political economy and comparative constitutions have established various stylized facts and raised new questions about how political institutions shape dynamics of policy, we expect fruitful insights from such an approach.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Step 
This is a standard result proved by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) .
Step B. For any 2 [0; 1) ; in any legislative equilibrium with proposal strategy ; z 1 ; z 1 = 1; where z 1 ( ; 0; :::; 0) : In other words, if the prevailing default is the ideal policy of the agenda setter, it remains till the end of the legislative session. This claim is obvious since U 1 (x) < U 1 z 1 for all x 6 = z 1 :
Step C. Assume > 0: Consider any pure-strategy legislative equilibrium with policy rule f: Suppose that there exists some d 2 X such that 0 jfj 6 = 1 :
is the prevailing default, z 1 is politically feasible and the agenda setter is strictly better o¤ proposing z 1 than remaining the default. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. Parts 1 and 2 are implied by Part 3 of the proposition. The proof of Part 3 is based on construction and veri…cation of an equilibrium.
Step A. Given the policy rule described in the proposition, we …rst verify that the value functions satisfy equation (1). This step is straightforward.
Step B. Given the value functions described in the proposition, we then verify that, for all d 2 X; f (d) solves problem (2) of the agenda setter. To do so, take any d 2 X:
Proof. Note that e (d) e (d) min fd 2 ; d 3 g : Let j 6 = 1 be such that d j = min fd 2 ; d 3 g :
Proof. Discuss four cases. Case 1. Take any x 0 2 X such that e (x 0 ) > e (d) : Then
for all 2 [0; 1) su¢ ciently large.
Case 2. Take any x 0 2 X such that e (x 0 ) < e (d) : Then for all i 6 = 1;
Case 3. Take any x 0 2 X such that e (x 0 ) = e (d) and Step A. Given the policy rule described by (i)-(iii) in part 3 of the proposition, we …rst verify that the value functions satisfy equation (1). This step is straightforward.
Step B. Given the value functions described in the proposition, we then verify that, for Step A. We …rst conjecture that the policy rule f (d) solves 
For any d 2 X such that the maximization problem (3) has a unique solution, we claim that f (f (d)) = f (d) : To prove it, suppose this is not true. Then
due to uniqueness of the maximum, and
This contradicts the fact that f (d) solves the maximization problem (3). For any d 2 X such that the maximization problem (3) has more than one solution, we impose the condition that f (f (d)) = f (d) in our conjecture.
Step B. Given the conjectured policy rule f; we thus construct the value functions by
(1). In particular, U i (d) = (1 ) u i (d) + u i (f (d)) for all i and all d 2 X:
Step C. Given the constructed value functions, we then verify that the conjectured policy rule f solves the maximization problem (2) of the agenda setter. Note that the agenda setter's original problem (2) is di¤erent from the maximization problem (3) on which the conjectured policy rule is based. In particular, for any d; x 0 2 X; we can show that either
The procedure of the veri…cation is the same as those for Propositions 2 and 4 and thus it is omitted here.
Step D. Finally we are ready to solve the equilibrium policy outcome resulting from the initial default d = (0; 0; 0) : Note that even though we are given a speci…c initial default policy we still have to guess and verify the policy rule f for all d 2 X: This is because all the players have to calculate the consequences of the choice of any policy x 0 2 X since any approved policy becomes the new default policy had the legislative session continued. In this …nal stage, solving f ((0; 0; 0)) involves solving the maximization problem (3) over a …nite policy space X: Potentially, this may require pairwise comparisons, which could be tedious. Here we take a di¤erent approach. We …rst transform and simplify the maximization problem (3) into the following one, assuming a continuous policy space: 
Observe that the last weak inequality constraint on x 0 2 must be binding, and this constraint also guarantees that x 0 2 0: We then solve this transformed maximization problem (4) over a continuous policy space, ignoring the second last inequality constraint. The second-order su¢ cient conditions are obviously satis…ed, whereas the …rst-order necessary conditions imply that 0 = ; x 0 2 = x 0 3 = 1 6
: Since x 0 1 = 2 3 0; the second last inequality constraint is satis…ed. Note that the optimal policy x of the continuous maximization problem is on the grid point of the …nite policy space X: Since x attains the unique maximum in the continuous problem, it also attains the maximum in the maximization problem (3) over the …nite policy space X:
